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q EXEMPLARY LEGAL WRITING 2019 q
BOOKS

FIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

G. Edward White† & Sarah A. Seo*
Jill Elaine Hasday
Intimate Lies and the Law
(Oxford University Press 2019)
In the song “Natalie Cook” from the musical podcast “36 Questions,” a
married couple deals with the fallout from the husband’s discovery that his
wife is really an individual named Judith, who “built a past / Made up a history
/ Details that fit this person named / Natalie.” When the husband accuses
the wife, “You’re the one who made her up,” Natalie/Judith responds, “It was
a bit more collaborative than you’re remembering.” Deception in intimate
relationships is complex and pervasive, ranging from innocent white lies (“you
look great, honey”) to outright fraud. It’s difficult for the individuals involved
to unpack the layers of dishonesty upon layers of emotion, let alone for those
on the outside to make sense of those layers. But time and again, people deceived have petitioned for legal redress and, as a result, deception among the
ties that bind is profoundly shaped by law. This is the point of Jill Hasday’s
fascinating book Intimate Lies and the Law, which explores the history, psychology, and social practices of intimate deception, which all intersect with the
law. The book provides seemingly made-for-TV stories of fathers inventing
†
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careers, mothers withholding the truth about paternity, siblings misrepresenting financial arrangements, and partners lying about their education, marital
status, sexuality, or even race, and more. Most of the cases involve lovers,
betrotheds, and married couples, so the book is also a study of gender and
American law’s complicated relationship between women’s rights and the
need to protect women (although, to be clear, men are not the only deceivers).
Hasday argues that the law inadequately protects the deceived and that
legislators and judges should extend them the same protections that apply to
deception outside intimate relationships. Those skeptical of this proposal might
contend that bestowing more protections would intrusively insert the law into
private relationships and that doing so would amount to a radical change.
But Hasday shows that the law has not always been so resistant to intimate
deception claims and that our current laws, by making deception easy to carry
out, do not leave our relationships untouched. In other words, the question
is not whether the law should regulate intimate deception; rather, the question
is how we want the law to govern our personal lives.
Eric P. Perramond
Unsettled Waters: Rights, Law, and Identity in the American West
(University of California Press 2018)
This book is not an easy read. It is a detailed analysis of the process by
which the state of New Mexico, pursuant to the enactment of a “water code”
in 1907, has sought to account for all existing uses of water in all the watersheds of the state. That process is called “general stream adjudications.” It
begins with state engineers mapping out land parcels with water rights, the
points where flows of water diverge, the crops grown on the parcels, the first
date there was “beneficial use” of water on the parcels (“beneficial use” being
equated with the utilization of water to the advantage of humans), and the
water use of the parcels, in acre-feet, each year. The adjudication process presumes that although the state of New Mexico owns all the water in it, individuals have private rights in portions of that water and may treat those portions
as commodities to buy or sell. Although the adjudication of water use began
shortly after New Mexico enacted the 1907 water code, it has been completed
only in a few areas and is expected to continue for many more generations.
State officials involved with the adjudication process think of it as benign.
The state is not seeking to appropriate any of the water it surveys; it is simply
attempting to map it, recording where it exists and what private individuals
are involved in water use in particular areas. The theory of adjudication, from
the perspective of those officials, is to give the state a good understanding of
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where water exists within its boundaries and who has private rights in it, with
a view to making use of that knowledge in an environment in which water is
a scarce commodity — New Mexico is largely arid and lacks a significant
snowpack — and may get more scarce in the future. Engineers employed by
the Office of the State Engineer, when charged with gathering information
about water use, frequently express surprise at the hostility their presence
engenders among local residents. They view adjudication not as an adversarial
process, like a trial in a court, but simply as one comparable to charting an
ocean or mapping out a mountain range. Adjudications are not designed to
“take anyone’s water,” they believe, but the reverse: to confirm the identity of
individuals who have private rights to water in various localities.
And yet numerous New Mexico residents who live in areas with discernible water supplies have a hostile view of adjudication, and seek to resist participating in it in various ways. Many indigenous tribes in New Mexico attempt
to bypass the adjudication process altogether, engaging in “settlements” where
the state pays them money to redirect their water uses in ways the state regards
as beneficial. Other communities in the state, particular ones populated by
persons of Latino origin, have resisted complying with adjudication, delaying
the process. Interviews with “mayordomos” or “mayordomas,” individuals
centrally involved with the use of “acequias” (ditches used to facilitate the
flow of water along which some residents settle) reveal a deep suspicion that
adjudication will serve to fragment the communal ethos of water use in those
communities, and thereby discourage future settlement alongside the acequias,
because once private rights in the water flowing through the acequias have
been established, some “owners” of water might be inclined to sell those
rights, disrupting the expectation that all residents along an acequia have free
and equal use of its water.
Perramond is a geographer based in an environmental studies department
at Colorado College, whose initial exploration of New Mexico’s water adjudication process stemmed from his disciplinary interest in how the state was
identifying and making use of the water in it. But he recognized, early on,
that understanding adjudication required recourse to the history of populations in the state and to the traditional treatment of water rights in the
American southwest, as well as to the legal skills necessary to implement the
state’s 1907 water code. As he probed more deeply into the historical and
legal issues connected to adjudication, he came to recognize that the process
raises questions akin to those Robert Ellickson explored in Order Without
Law: how do communities, confronted with the prospect of legal proceedings
that threaten to regulate their lives in new and potentially threatening ways,
respond to those proceedings? One answer emerging from Perramond’s
312
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studies of water adjudication is that sometimes communities act in the way
Ellickson’s ranchers acted, by seeking to defy the legal system or to make use
of it to bypass their perceived obligations.
The result is a fascinating cast of characters and historical issues, each
connected to the adjudication of water rights in New Mexico but unearthing
numerous other themes in the history, geography, and ethnography of the
state and region. One is continually struck, throughout Unsettled Waters, by
the contrast between the well-intentioned aspirations of state engineers participating in adjudication, who view the process as helping not just the state but
also its citizens, and the deep apprehension fostered by the prospect of adjudication in communities accustomed to traditional, communal uses of water.
One wonders, in the end, whether any effort on the part of a western state
to determine, let alone regulate, the use of water by its residents could fail to
engender that sort of apprehension. Water is critical to arid states, but it is
also deeply cherished, and some of the populations of those states believe that
sharing water is necessary for survival and one cannot trust state governments or officials to recognize that. Unsettled Waters makes those points in
admirable if sometimes excruciating detail.
Kathryn D. Temple
Loving Justice: Legal Emotions in William Blackstone’s England
(NYU Press 2019)
The relationship between law and emotion is an exciting, new field of
inquiry within the Law and Humanities movement, and Kathryn Temple’s
Loving Justice provides an exquisite example of this cutting-edge scholarship.
Her argument is not that the law should pay more attention to human emotions but that it already does. Loving Justice closely examines Blackstone’s
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765-69) to explain that much of their
success and staying power stem from how they guided readers to feel about
the English common law. For instance, the Commentaries described Eastern
despotism (personified by extravagant and whimsical “Eastern queens”) with
disgust. Then it instructed readers to desire the “harmonic justice” of the
common law as a better alternative. According to Temple, “harmonic justice,”
which is not the same as “justice,” refers to balance, communal peace, and the
status quo, where everyone resides in their proper place. Harmonic justice
thus “resists change and justifies oppression” (169). But Blackstone quieted
unease about the conservative pull of harmonic justice by evoking feelings of
happiness, not in the individualistic sense but in the 18th-century political
sense of ordered liberty. As Temple explains, “When the Commentaries rep-
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resents English law as just, as balanced, in harmony with its own past and
with the world, readers respond by feeling happy and thus become attached
to the common law” (149). In short, the Commentaries played to readers’
emotions in order to cultivate their loyalty to English law.
Temple’s analysis has implications for contemporary American law, given
how enthusiastically Americans embraced the Commentaries. To make this point,
Temple offers an intriguing analysis of To Kill a Mockingbird, highlighting how
Blackstonian harmonic justice appears in the novel through, for instance,
Calpurnia’s reading of the Commentaries to learn “fine English” and the
“sagging” courthouse in the town of Maycomb “stuck in time” (173, 175).
The idea of harmonic justice mirrors Harper Lee’s themes of gradualism, where
racial progress happens slowly — so slow, in fact, that scenes of happiness,
which take place when the residents of Maycomb remain within established
race, class, and gender hierarchies, belie any progress. In light of the “harm”
in harmonic justice, where are we then to find justice? Temple suggests that
we look to our emotions. We should be wary if the law seeks to make us
happy, and instead of satisfaction, we should seek disruption and agitation.
William Twining
Jurist in Context: A Memoir
(Cambridge University Press 2019)
Twining “anticipate[s] several kinds of readers” of this book: “academic
lawyers”; “specialists” in “Jurisprudence, Evidence, Legal Education, and
Globalisation”; and “‘non lawyers,’ especially academics in other disciplines,
but also anyone interested in law.” There is in fact a little something for all
of those audiences in the book. Twining has had a remarkable and varied
academic career, being at several universities on three continents. He has
made significant contributions to all of the specialized fields he names. And
he has been a persistent reformist voice in legal education.
I treated myself to spending time with the features of Twining’s life and
career that I have found most interesting, while largely ignoring some others.
The latter tended to be the “heavier” portions of Twining’s narrative, which
include charts for teaching jurisprudence, “rethinking” Evidence, and “globalisation theory.” I preferred two other subjects. One was the details of his
peripatetic life and the academic institutions with which he has come in contact. Twining was born in Kampala, Uganda, spent World War II marooned
on Mauritius, attended public schools in England and Braesnose College at
Oxford, and from there traveled back and forth between England and Chicago before eventually accepting a Lectureship in Private Law at the University
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of Khartoum in the Sedan at the age of 24. From Khartoum he would go to
a Senior Lectureship at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika (now
part of Tanzania) in 1961, a professorship in Jurisprudence at Queen’s University in Belfast in 1966, a professorship at Warwick in 1972, and the Quain
Professorship of Jurisprudence at University College, London in 1982.
Along the way he spent intervals at Chicago and Yale Law Schools, held
visiting professorships of law at Northwestern and Virginia, and began a 40year association with Miami Law School in 1971.
All of this drew Twining into contact with some of the great and good in
the U.K. and U.S. legal academies. H.L.A. Hart was one of his tutors at
Braesnose; Ronald Dworkin a colleague at University College; Robert Stevens
his sponsor on a fellowship to Yale and later co-editor of the “Law in Context”
series of books; Karl Llewellyn his principal jurisprudential mentor; Soia
Mentschikoff responsible for his organizing Llewellyn’s papers and eventually writing Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement, still one of the leading
studies of American Legal Realism; Neil MacCormick and Terry Anderson
close friends and colleagues at University College and Miami; Patrick Atiyah,
whom he first met at Khartoum, a longtime friend and co-devotee of “law in
context.”
I found it intriguing, having known Twining and a fair number of the
other persons he portrays, to learn why he might have formed close relationships with some, such as Atiyah, Llewellyn, and MacCormick; more distant
ones with others, such as Dworkin; and an antagonistic view of a few, such as
Aaron Director and William Winslow Crosskey at Chicago, the former of
whom Twining thought a closed-minded ideologue and the latter he characterizes as “the worst teacher that I ever had during my legal education.”
A final treat for me was Twining’s views on being an English visitor at an
American law school. I believe that affiliating leading U.K. academics with
American law schools often amounts to a “win-win.” Established U.K. academics are paid far less than their American equivalents, but at the same time
typically have less demanding teaching loads, often providing them with
opportunities to spend time at U.S. law schools without having to take leave
from their home institutions. Their presence at American law schools is often
stimulating to many resident faculty, not just to those who do comparative
work. Their visibility also adds prestige to U.S. law faculties.
Twining’s relationship with Miami was in some respects ideal. Initially he
visited as a “guest” of Mentschikoff when she was Dean; later, after “retiring”
from UCL (he became a Research Professor in 1999), he came as a springsemester Visiting Professor, avoiding “the hurricane season” in Florida’s fall
and escaping from the sometimes unfortunate English weather during the
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late winter and early spring. Because Twining had “retired,” which in his case
meant freedom from administration as well as teaching, he had more time to
write, and was quite productive in the early decades of the 21st century.
At one point the faculty of Miami unanimously voted that Twining should
be offered a half-time tenured position, and, incredibly, the then Dean vetoed
the arrangement. In recalling the event, Twining states that he “was ambivalent, but I would probably have accepted.” He then says:
My first reaction was: if you treat me like a visitor, I shall behave
like a visitor. If I had been appointed I would have gained financially . . . but I would have felt an obligation to teach mainstream
courses and to work to improve the institution, including fighting
hard to make the Law School distinctive.

I see that passage as capturing the calculus of many U.K. visitors on American law faculties and also revealing some of Twining’s distinctive qualities.
The seeming benefits to U.K. visitors at American law schools are the absence
of committee responsibilities and pressure to teach “mainstream” courses;
the seeming costs may involve a perceived expectation that visitors shouldn’t
concern themselves with the internal politics or professional goals of the
school. The latter may be welcomed by some visitors, but it can result in their
remaining somewhat detached from some of the central issues affecting their
colleagues. Many U.K. visitors might hesitate to accept half-time tenured
offers because of the prospective institutional engagement accompanying the
offer, but others may feel, as Twining says of his time at Miami, that he did
not quite belong: “Was I a perennial guest? Or a full member? Or an intriguing foreigner? Or just a hanger on?”
Twining also refers in the quoted passage to “work[ing] to improve the
institution, including fighting hard to make it distinctive.” That was characteristic of his stance toward every law school at which he was a full-time
faculty member. Whether it was imbuing African students with a sense of the
heritage of English law, or developing the idea of “law in context” at Queen’s
and Warwick, or attempting to encourage UCL to modify some of its hoary
approaches to scholarship or teaching, Twining was a compulsive “fighter”
to change his home institution for what he regarded as the better. And he
invariably had, and still has, a clear vision of what “better” meant, whether it
was a four-year undergraduate program for Queen’s or Warwick or making
Miami into a distinctive regional school with an international emphasis.
Twining was, and still is, a compulsive reformer of legal education. I find that
dimension of his career exhausting, even when (as in the case of a four-year
requirement of those studying law in the U.K.) I agree with his goals. But
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when one thinks of William Twining, one thinks not only of the broadranging scholar and international traveler but also of someone who is incapable of not thinking about and tinkering with the goals and programs of
legal education. That is an essential part of his legacy, and Jurist in Context
brings it home.
Anthony Kronman
The Assault on American Excellence
(Free Press 2019)
This is an impressively reasoned, beautifully written, and deeply felt book.
It may have been inspired by two incidents that introduce and close it. The
first was a decision by the master of Pierson College at Yale University, in the
summer of 2015, no longer to use that title to refer to himself because some
students had complained that it reminded them of the plantation culture of
the antebellum South and slavery. The second was the decision, over a period
stretching from the fall of 2015 to December 2016, to change the name of
another residential college at Yale, Calhoun College, because when the Yale
Corporation named that college in 1930, it had done so in recognition of John
C. Calhoun, a Senator from South Carolina from the 1830s to the 1850s who
had been a vigorous defender of “states’ rights” within the framework of the
American Constitution, especially the rights of slave states to perpetuate the
institution of slavery.
Kronman, a former Dean of Yale Law School who has remained on the
Yale law faculty since leaving the Deanship in 2004, initially found it hard to
take the Pierson College master’s gesture seriously, since he felt that it was
so plain, in an academic community, that the term “master” had a different
meaning, one in keeping with the expectation that in such communities students are taught academic subjects by persons with a “mastery” of those subjects
based on a combination of expertise and experience. But soon Yale acquiesced
in the Pierson College master’s decision and announced that it would no
longer use the term “master” to refer to the heads of its residential colleges.
At the same time, the President of Yale gave a speech to the incoming freshman class urging the university community to start a “conversation” about
whether Calhoun College should be renamed. After initially concluding that
it should not, on the ground that John Calhoun and his connection to slavery
was part of Yale’s history and ought to be reflected upon rather than erased,
the President reversed his position after “howls of protest” from some students
and appointed two committees to study the matter, establish “principles” for
renaming, and ultimately decide the Calhoun College issue. The latter of
those committees eventually resolved to rename the college. Kronman found
NUMBER 2 (2020)
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the President’s action inappropriate and the renaming process, which advanced no reasons for why Calhoun College should be renamed but other Yale
colleges named for persons who had held views now thought to be racist or
otherwise deplorable not, farcical. He also found the episodes “representative
expressions of a whole way of thinking about the aims of higher education
that has captured the imagination of faculty and administrators at Yale and
countless other schools across the country and done real damage to our colleges and universities.”
The Assault on American Excellence is an attack on that way of thinking.
Kronman describes the way of thinking as an effort to replace an “aristocratic ideal” of higher education with an ideal based on democratic principles
and vocational training. He singles out three features of the effort. One is a
restricted view of speech in college and university communities which seeks
to curtail speech perceived as being offensive to some members of those
communities, particularly those belonging to historically disadvantaged or
marginalized groups. The second is an overriding commitment to “diversity,” by which is principally meant diversity of race, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation, without a corresponding inclination to entertain “diverse”
views on whether that particular conception of diversity is good or bad for
higher education. The third is what Kronman calls “the campaign for renaming,” which “seeks to reshape campus life in the light of a political ideal,” one driven by equality. That campaign attempts to “flatten or level . . .
reminders that our predecessors subscribed to values sharply different from
our own.”
In The Assault on Academic Excellence Kronman levels trenchant criticism at
each of those positions. His critique is premised on a defense of an “aristocratic”
ideal of higher education. Kronman uses the term “aristocratic” in Plato’s
and Aristotle’s sense, not as a belief that power and wealth should be equated
with high social rank and foster class-based deference but as a description of a
process in which individual humans are encouraged to cultivate their intellectual and moral faculties so as to become more refined, curious, and ultimately
freer and more autonomous beings. The aristocratic ideal is one that sees
higher education as designed to develop, especially in persons of college age,
greater capacity to think independently, to reason, to clarify their intellectual,
political, and spiritual views, and to acquire knowledge to aid them in those
efforts. Aristocratic higher education is not an exchange of information or
ideas by equals. It is a hierarchical process, in which young and inexperienced
persons in the process of intellectual growth are taught by older and more
experienced persons. The teaching is not just about the mastery of academic
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subjects but about how to think, how to reason, and how to examine and
justify one’s feelings.
The principal forum of aristocratic higher education is the conversation.
Kronman contrasts controlled conversations in colleges and universities, which
typically take the form of course seminars or lectures, with two other forums:
“Speakers’ Corner,” where speakers advance ideas into a “marketplace” of listeners, and listeners are not expected to converse with the speakers, but merely
to signal their approval or disapproval of the ideas (sometimes through heckling
the speaker); and with a home “dinner table,” at which sometimes conversations
need to be stopped or altered because their subject matter is upsetting to
members of a family and the ideal of “love” among those members functions
to make the feelings of the upset members paramount to the conversation
itself. In conversations in higher education, by contrast, heckling of another
student’s views is not permitted, nor is it appropriate for a student to shut off
another’s views simply because he or she finds them offensive. The purpose
of the conversation is not simply to assert views or to decline to hear them, but
to critique and to defend the views being discussed. In that fashion those
taking part in the conversation are encouraged to explore, reflect upon, and
refine their intellectual and philosophical positions and thus to grow as human
beings in the process.
Kronman contrasts the aristocratic ideal or higher education with what he
calls a vocational ideal, in which “the principal means of human fulfillment” is
defined as “that of work, as distinct from everything we do outside it or in
our leisure time.” The vocational ideal “establishes a particularly close connection between what we do for a living and our sense of purposefulness in life.”
It “shifts our judgments about the relative status of human beings from who
they are — from their character and competence in the art of living — to what
they do — to the jobs they perform and the position they occupy in the economic division of labor.” Today’s colleges and universities, Kronman feels, are
“in thrall to the vocational ideal,” In his view, this is primarily because the vocational ideal implicitly reinforces the idea that there is something odious about
treating human beings differently because of their “character and competence
in the art of living”; that somehow valuing some people more highly than others
because they adapt better to the exercises of aristocratic higher education —
such as grades and class rankings — offends against an “anti-subordination
principle” designed to prevent humans from treating some individuals or groups
as superior to others. Shifting the focus from “competence” in aristocratic
exercises to “skills training” makes aristocratic-based distinctions among students seem less pointed. For Kronman that is an effort to minimize one of
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the central purposes of human life, the growth and cultivation of one’s intellectual and moral sensibility, which may have little to do with one’s work.
It is from these starting points — the positing of an aristocratic ideal of
higher education and the corresponding rejection of a vocational ideal — that
Kronman launches his critique of the assault on American excellence. I will
not summarize the details of his attack on the foundational propositions of
that assault, listed above. Suffice it to say that his critiques are trenchant, well
expressed, and worthy or serious attention. That is especially so, in my view,
because they should have the cumulative effect of asking those apparently
committed to the positions Kronman attacks to depart from their lemminglike posture of political correctness and defend their positions in the same
manner Kronman advances his.
In his epilogue Kronman states that although in politics, “I still endorse
progressive positions on the whole,” when “it comes to the academy . . . my
views have become steadily more conservative.” There may be a risk that those
labels will be misunderstood. Elsewhere Kronman maintains that “our colleges
and universities are not political institutions; . . . that they belong to a different
order of values and expectations; and that their first responsibility is to themselves and their undemocratic way of life.” To me that is a “conservative”
stance only in the sense that it seeks to “conserve” a view of higher education
in place in America from the founding generation, under assault from those
seeking to “democratiz[e] the inner life of our colleges and universities so that
the rule of equality which prevails outside them comes to be the norm in the
now masterless world of teaching and learning as well.” “Enough is enough,”
Kronman concludes. “It is time to rally round.” Rallies are not my style, but
I am joining this one.
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